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INTRODUCTION 
Over the last decade, Mexico's economy has been undergoing a 
series of exciting changes. In 1983, Mexico was still a highly 
inward-oriented economy with a government that was outspoken in 
its criticism of multinational cooperations. Today, Mexico ranks 
among the most outwardly-oriented developing economies of the 
world (Nunez p. 7). The present administration, under the 
leadership of President Salinas, has implemented significant 
changes aimed at liberalizing Mexico's policy towards foreign 
direct investment (FDI). The changes in Mexico's policy have been 
largely in response to the 1982 debt crisis and deteriorating 
economic conditions. This study deals with the way in which 
macro-economic conditions, political and economic stability1, and 
policy incentives influence FDI flows to Mexico. Specifically, 
the model examines the effect of Salinas' policy initiatives on 
FDI in Mexico. 
Research in this area is meaningful for many reasons. First, 
being the world's fifteenth largest economy, Mexico is clearly an 
important member of today's global economy. Over the last few 
decades, Mexico's economy has been experiencing impressive growth 
rates. In 1975, Mexico's real gross domestic product (GDP) grew 
by 5.7%. 
In the early 1980s, real growth rates were between 8% and 
9%. In 1982 however, the real growth rate plunged to an alarming 
4%. In recent years, the growth rate has been between 1.87% in 
1987 and 3.98% in 1990. Some of the slowdown in GDP growth rates 
can be attributed to the debt crisis in 1982. Mexico also has its 
share of economic problems. Many of the recent economic reforms, 
including the change in Mexico's policies towards FDI, have been 
in response to the sudden slowdown. Nevertheless, Mexico's 
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economy has still been doing relatively well. As such, it is 
hardly surprising that Mexico is among the largest recipients of 
FDI from the industrialized nations. Over the period from 1955- 
1982, Mexico received over $13.44 billion in FDI (Nunez p. 17). 
Graph 1 : FDI vs GROWTH 
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From the above graph, it is reasonably clear that there is a positive 
relationship between growth and FDI. This supports the findings of this 
study. 
FDI flows to Mexico are expected to continue to grow rapidly 
over the next decade. Part of this is due to the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the United States, Canada 
and Mexico. Among these three nations, Mexico has the comparative 
advantage in low-skill, labor intensive production. Under the 
auspices of NAFTA, multinational enterprises can set up cost 
efficient production facilities in Mexico and have access to the 
vast US and Canadian markets as well. 
The decision to engage in FDI is a long and deliberate 
process. It is a decision that involves a long term commitment of 
the multinational corporation's time, effort and resources. There 
are many factors that need to be taken into consideration. Not 
all of these factors are economic in nature, In fact, one of the 
primary considerations is political risk. Clearly, a nation that 
is likely to experience a coup is not a viable location for FDI. 
As such, any model that does not attempt to model political and 
economic stability would be incomplete. 
This study incorporates the effects of government policy on 
FDI. The current stance of Mexico's policy makers on this issue 
cannot be more different than it was two decades ago, when the 
"Law for the promotion of Mexican Investment and Regulation of 
Foreign Investment" of 1973 was passed. This piece of legislation 
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severely restricted foreign ownership rights in Mexico. Since his 
election in 1988, President Salinas has implemented various 
policies aimed, specifically at attracting foreign capital. In a 
recent interview with Forbes, Salinas states " We know we have to 
be competitive [in tax rates] on an international level if we are 
to compete for capital, which in the Nineties will be the key 
question for economic success or failure" (p. 64). Among other 
things, Mexico does not tax capital gains. Given this radical 
about-face in policies towards FDI, Mexico is the ideal candidate 
for this study of the effect of the government's policy stance on 
FDI flows. 
11. L i t e r a t u r e  Rev i ew  
There exists a vast body of literature that pertains to the 
FDI decision process. Over twenty years ago, Stephen Hymer 
pioneered work in this area with his seminal thesis on FDI and 
multinational enterprises. Since then, research in this area has 
taken off in many directions. Today, literature on FDI and the 
multinational corporation crosses disciplines. Substantial work 
on this subject can be found among the literature on 
international economics, international business, and finance. 
Most of the existing research concentrates heavily on the 
micro-economic considerations behind an individual firm's 
decision to invest abroad. Although these studies are not 
directly related to my research, they provide the micro-economic 
foundation upon which I can build my macro-economic model. My 
base model was put together under the guidance of Dr. Jian Hai 
Lin from the International Monetary Fund, He has conducted a 
similar study on Malaysia and Singapore. Dr. Lin discovered that 
in Malaysia, a sophisticated and relatively low cost labor force 
is of primary importance in attracting FDI. In his study, the 
impact of government policy incentives on FDI in Malaysia seemed 
to play a minimal role. In Singapore however, Dr. Lin discovered 
that FDI flows are positively related to incentives and 
inversely related to relative labor costs and inflation rates (p. 
44). 
My literature search was conducted in three stages. First, I 
looked for past theoretical and empirical work that supports the 
inclusion of the variables in my base model. Then, I researched 
past work on political risk assessment. Concurrently, I also 
looked for research related to the effects of government policy 
incentives on FDI flows. 
According to Dr. Lin, the growth rate of the market, 
relative labor costs, net exports, government debt, and inflation 
are important determinants of FDI. In the literature, there is 
much support for the importance of the growth rate of the market. 
Daniels and Radebaugh point out that one of the primary motives 
for investing abroad is to gain market access (p. 194). Dr. Lin 
found that the growth rate of the market (GDP growth) is a key 
variable in explaining FDI in Singapore and Malaysia (p. 59). In 
theory, the multinational corporation (MNC) need not set up a 
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plant inside a country in order to gain access to its market. The 
MNC can also gain market access by licensing and exporting. 
However, there are other real world considerations that often 
render these options unrealistic. An important example is 
transportation costs. For some products, the cost of 
transportation makes it impractical to export the good over any 
great distance. Other factors include trade barriers and 
consumers' preference for domestically produced goods (Daniels 
and Radebaugh, p. 195-197). 
Daniels and Radebaugh identify production costs as another 
important determinant of FDP. The realities of competing in a 
global marketplace make it necessary for MNCs to seek out the 
most cost efficient sources of raw materials and factors of 
production (p. 194). An empirical study by Cushman on the effects 
of real wages and labor productivity on FDI failed to support the 
theory that real wages are an important determinant of FDI in the 
US. Richard Caves argues that the decision to undertake FDI is a 
function of the cost of home production relative to the cost of 
foreign production. Since global financial markets are very 
integrated, capital has become very mobile. It is not so with 
labor. As such, the country with a comparative advantage in low 
cost labor will be a net recipient of foreign capital (Caves, p. 
21). 
In the literature, there is disagreement over the effect of 
the trade balance on FDI. The political risk assessment 
literature identifies the trade balance as an indicator of a 
country's political and economic stability. Persistently high 
trade deficits can result in the restriction of foreign exchange 
transfers. This inhibits the ability of the MNC to repatriate its 
profits. The government may also attempt to reduce imports by 
devaluing the local currency or by restricting imports of certain 
goods. MNCs often depend on external sources for their inputs to 
production. As such, a devaluation of the local currency 
increases production costs as intermediate goods become more 
expensive. Similarly, import restrictions raise production costs 
or impede production. In this sense, a high trade deficit 
discourages FDI (Bunn and Mustafaoglu, p. 1565-66). 
It is also argued that a high trade deficit weakens the 
country's currency. On the one hand, this makes it more expensive 
for MNCs to import intermediate goods. On the other hand a weaker 
currency should stimulate demand for the country's exports, 
stimulate production and consequently, raise income and improve 
the population's purchasing power (Madura, p. 484). As such, the 
MNC will be able to sell more of its products both within the 
country and export more to the rest of the world. In this sense, 
a high trade deficit may be appealing to foreign investors. 
Clearly, the literature does not tell us whether a high trade 
deficit should be considered an indication of economic stability 
or economic instability. 
Another important indicator of economic stability is the 
external debt level. This is very closely related to the trade 
deficit in that a sustained trade deficit year after year 
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contributes to the external debt level. The external debt figure 
includes government and private debt. A high government debt 
level discourages FDI. This is especially true if the government 
is an important customer of the MNC in that a large debt may 
curtail the purchasing power of the government and hence harm the 
profitability of the MNC (Madura p. 484). High private debt 
levels are also harmful in that they contribute to the overall 
level of external debt. A high external debt level does not 
inspire confidence in investors in that there is a higher risk of 
the country defaulting on its external obligations. This does not 
help the country's economy or the MNC's profitability. This was 
exactly the case with Mexico in the 1982 debt crisis. Mexico's 
high external debt (refer to Graph 2) level can be linked to the 
plunge in the real GDP growth rate (refer to Graph 1) and the 
decrease in FDI to Mexico. 
I- - -  - -  - GRAPH 2 : FDI vs. DEBT 
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The graph suggests that the relationship between external debt and FDI is 
somewhat ambiguous. From 1975-1981, the appears to be a positive 
relationship. The opposite is true for all other years. Model A supports the 
positive relationship. DEBT is probably not a good proxy for stability. 
Finally, inflation is significant because inflation affects 
the purchasing power of consumers and as a result, consumer 
demand for the MNC's products (Madura p. 482). Nunez points out 
that inflation also pushes up the costs of production and may eat 
into the profits that an MNC hopes to repatriate (p. 31). Dr Lin 
also found that inflation is a key explanatory variable of FDI in 
Malaysia and Singapore (p. 59). 
111. The Base Model 
The first step in this study is to estimate the base model. 
The base model uses macro-economic variables to explain FDI into 
Mexico. It does not include the government policy variable. The 
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base model is important because the final model can then be 
compared with it. The comparison may yield some insights as to 
the effects of the government policy variable on FDI. The base 
model also gives an initial indication of how well the final 
model can be expected to explain FDI in Mexico. 
FDI in Mexico is hypothesized to be a function of real GDP 
growth, relative labor costs, net exports, government deficit and 
inflation : 
FDI = f(GROWTH, INF, LABOR - US/MEX, NET - EXP, DEBT) 
The empirical model is as follows : 
FDI = a + b * GROWTH + c * INF + d * LABOR-US/MEX + e * 
NET - EXP + f * DEBT + error 
Table 1 describes the variables. The data are time series from 
1971-1990. Where applicable, all variables are measured in real 
terms. Data for unit labor costs for both the US and Mexico are 
not available for 1989 and 1990. As such, OLS regressions of US 
unit labor cost and Mexico's unit labor cost as functions of time 
were run. The data for 1989 and 1990 are extrapolated from the 
results of the regression2. 
TABLE 1 : DEFINITION OF VARIABLES 
I I 1 
I VAR'ABLE lTYPE 1 DEFINITION I 
GROWTH 
I I 
Macro-economic % annual growth in Mexico's GDP I I 
FDI 
I ~acro-economic IInflation rate calculated from GDP deflator 
LABOR-USIMEX Labor cost I I 1 Relative unit labor cost, US/Mexico 
Dependent 
Labor cost I Mexico's unit labor cost 
Mexico's total real foreign direct investment 
SALINAS 
IN=-=P 
Stability 
Stability 
Policy 
I Mexico's real net exports 
Mexico's external debt - government and private 
Policy variable - dummy 
- 1 Salinas is President 
- 0 otherwise 
I 
Note : Where applicable, all variables are in millions of constant US$, 
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IV. Base Model - Hypothesis 
1) Real GDP growth (GROWTH) is expected to have a positive 
impact on FDI. This is because a high growth rate will 
attract MNCs that are seeking to expand into new and growing 
markets. 
2) Inflation (INF) discourages FDI in that it increases the cost 
of production and eats into the profits that a MNC may hope 
to repatriate. A high inflation rate also slows the real GDP 
growth rate and erodes the purchasing power of Mexican 
consumers. 
3) Relative labor cost (LABOR US/MEX) is expected to have a 
positive impact on FDI. MNCS that have already decided to 
invest in this region are presumably hoping to gain access to 
one or more of the markets in this region (i.e. the United 
States, Canada and Mexico). These MNCs have the option of 
locating their production facilities in the United States, 
Canada, or Mexico. In making this decision, relative unit 
labor costs clearly is an important consideration. Production 
costs in the United States and Canada are not significantly 
different. Since the United States is the largest source of 
FDI in Mexico, I chose to compare its (rather than Canada's) 
unit labor cost with Mexico's. This is also more consistent 
with the Caves1 theory that "domestic" (United States) vs 
foreign production costs are important. Even if the FDI is 
from outside the United States (such as the European 
Community), United States/Mexico labor costs are the relevant 
costs to be considered because MNCs that choose to locate in 
this region compare production costs in the US (or Canada) 
with production costs in Mexico. As LABOR US/MEX increases, 
Mexico's labor costs are becoming relatively cheaper, thus 
increasing FDI. 
4) LABOR is an alternative measure of production cost. The LABOR 
variable takes only Mexico's productivity adjusted labor 
costs into account. As Mexico's labor cost increases, FDI 
should decrease. 
5) The expe'cted sign of Net Exports (NET EXP) is uncertain. On 
the one hand, continued high trade dezicits can result in 
restrictions on foreign exchange transfers. This inhibits the 
ability of the MNC to repatriate profits. The government may 
also attempt to reduce imports by devaluing the local 
currency or by restricting the imports of intermediate goods 
that the MNC depends on. This discourages FDI. Also a trade 
deficit results in a lower exchange rate. Although this makes 
imports of intermediate goods more expensive, it also makes 
the country's exports more competitive in world markets. 
Foreign investors often find this aspect of a lower exchange 
rate appealing. As such, the ultimate effect of a high trade 
deficit is ambiguous. 
6) External debt (DEBT) is expected to be negatively related 
to FDI. A large debt level increases the probability of 
default. This is an indication of the economic and political 
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instability and as suchi should discourage FDI. 
V. Base Model - Results 
The empirical model was regressed using Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS). Two separate models are regressed. Model A uses 
includes all variables discussed in the hypotheses section except 
LABOR. This is because LABOR and LABOR US/MEX are alternative 
measures of prodaction costs. As such,-they are used 
interchangeably. The data are time series, from 1970-1990. All 
data have been extracted from the World Bank's World Tables 
1992. The results are summarized in Table 2. 
TABLE 2 : OLS REGRESSION ANALYSIS I 
GROWTH 
t 
INF 
LABOR-USJMEX 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
LABOR 
NET-EXP 
EXPECTED 
SIGN 
First, Model A is discussed. ~esides LABOR US/MEX, all of 
the variables are significant. The GROWTH variaEle has the 
largest coefficient. It is also significant at the alpha = .10 
level. As hypothesized, the GBP growth rate is important in 
explaining FDI to Mexico. The pattern of FDI and GROWTH in Graph 
1 supports this result. The INF variable is also statistically 
significant and turned out as predicted. 
SALINAS 
CONSTANT 
R-SQR 
ADJ R-SQR 
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MODELA MODELB 
+ 
(1.6086) 
-221.407 
0.787 
0.71 0 
1328.379 
0.675 
0.588 
The NET EXP variable turned out to be negative, This 
supports thetheory that a high trade deficit is an indication of 
economic instability. Evidently, MNCs weigh the risk of 
devaluation, foreign exchange restrictions and import 
restrictions more heavily than the advantages associated with 
exporting from a country with a more competitive exchange rate. 
Only the relative labor cost variable (LABOR US/MEX) is not 
significant at the alpha = .10 level. This may be-because in 
recent years, while the US is still the largest investor in 
Mexico, significant portions of its FDI have been coming from 
other parts of the world as well. This may cause the results to 
be somewhat distorted. From Graph 3, it appears that until the 
late 70s, there was a positive relationship between FDI and 
LABOR - US/MEX. The relationship seems to break down after that. 
- - 
- - - - I 
Graph 3 : FDI vs LABOR - USJMEX 
Mexico, 1971 -1 990 
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1 The data do not suggest a strong positive relationship between relative labor costs and FDI. From 1982, the positive relationship seem to break down. This 
i indicates that a comparison of labor costs between the US and Mexico may not be appropriate. L-- - - . j 
The sign for the external debt variable (DEBT) did not turn 
out as expected. However, the size of the coefficient is also 
small. I suspect that net exports (NET EXP) and external debt 
(DEBT) are closely related. I had inteEded that they proxy the 
same thing - stability. As such, it may be more appropriate to 
leave  DEBT^ out of the equation. The regression explains 71.0286% 
of FDI flows to Mexico. 
Model B is a variation of Model A. LABOR is used instead of 
LABOR US/MEX. Based on the results of MODEL A, the DEBT variable 
is drEpped. LABOR turned out to be negative and significant at 
Spring 1994 
the alpha = .O1 level4. The GROWTH variable is insignificant. All 
other variables turned out as expected and are statistically 
significant. 
Observe that all of the variables in the Model A and Model B 
are purely macro-economic and stability variables. It is clear 
from the hypotheses that there are sound economic reasons for 
including these variables into the model. These economic 
variables do a fairly good job explaining FDI flows to Mexico. 
However, from the literature search, it is clear that we must 
also take policy incentives and political factors into account in 
order to get a more complete picture of what is really going on. 
Graph 4 : FDI vs LABOR 
Mexico, 1 971 -1 988 
Year 
-m- REAL FDI -+ LABOR 
It is quite obvious that there is an inverse relationship between FDI and unit 
labor costs. This is a reasonably good proxy for the importance of production 
costs. 
VP. Model Includins Policy Variable 
Dornbusch claims that currently, one of Mexico's critical 
policy issues is "how to generate confidence in the economy" (p. 
313). This captures the essence of what the Salinas 
administration is trying to do. The only way Salinas can achieve 
his economic goals is to instill confidence in both domestic and 
foreign investors that economic and political conditions in 
Mexico guarantee a stable flow of returns on their investments. 
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Ih order to achieve this goal, the Salinas administration has, 
among other things, offered more competitive tax rates to MNCs. 
Mexico has also, in recent years, relaxed its foreign ownership 
restrictions. The recent North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) between the United States, Canada and Mexico has also 
stimulated a lot of confidence in Mexico. I needed to come up 
with a variable that reflects these changes and captures the 
effects of the return of investor confidence in Mexico. 
The expanded empirical model is essentially the same as 
Model B. The only difference is that a new variable, SALINAS is 
included into the equation. Various approaches to modeling policy 
incentives were considered. Initially, I had considered using tax 
rates on MNCs and foreign ownership restrictions. However, I had 
trouble obtaining data for these measures. Upon consultation with 
Dr. Dornbusch, it was confirmed that most of these data simply 
are not available. Dr. Dornbusch suggested that a dummy variable 
for the years Salinas has been in power will probably capture 
most of the effects that I am trying to model. After all, what I 
am basically trying to measure is expectations. 
The SALINAS variable is a dummy variable consisting of 1 for 
the years Salinas has been president (1989 and 1990) and 0 for 
all the other years. Salinas was inaugurated in August, 1988. 
However, the "Salinas effect" is expected to be lagged for two 
reasons. Firstly, the changes the Salinas administration has 
brought about did not occur overnight. These things take time. 
Secondly, it also takes time for MNCs to gather information 
regarding these reforms. A lot of time and resources are involved 
before an MNC can react to the changes implemented by the Salinas 
administration. A few MNCs may even want to wait for awhile 
before they have confidence in the ability of the new government 
to carry out these changes. As such, the SALINAS variable has 1s 
for 1989 and 1990. Clearly, the SALINAS variable is expected to 
have a positive impact on FDI. 
The expanded empirical model is estimated as follows : 
FDI = a + b * GROWTH + c * LABOR + d * NET - EXP + e * INF + 
f * SALINAS + error. 
Table 1 summarizes the definition of variables. All previous 
hypotheses apply. The new variable, SALINAS is expected to be 
positively related to FDI. The SALINAS variable represents the 
return of investor confidence in Mexico brought on by all the new 
policy incentives implemented by Salinas. 
VII. Expanded Model - Results 
Table 3 summarizes the results of the OLS regression for the 
expanded model. The results of the Model A and Model B are also 
tabulated for comparison. The models are described as follows: 
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MODEL A - Base model. 
MODEL B - Revised base model. Excludes DEBT and uses EABOR 
instead of LABOR US/MEX. 
MODEL C - MODEL B + SALINA~ variable or the expanded model. 
TABLE 3 : OLS REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE : FDI 
In model C, all the signs turned out as expected. Everything 
except inflation (INF) and unit labor cost (LABOR) is 
statistically significant at the alpha = .lo level. The SAEINAS 
variable is statistically significant even at the alpha = .01 
level. Its coefficient is also large. This suggests that Salinas 
has managed to do a lot for investor confidence in Mexico. In 
fact, the Salinas effect has been so large that apparently it has 
swamped even the effect of Mexico's low unit labor cost (LABOR). 
The LABOR variable was statistically significant in Model B but 
in Model C, it is not significant. By and large Salinas' policies 
appear to have been successful. If reliable data were available, 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
GROWTH 
INF 
LABOR-USIMEX 
LABOR 
NET-EXP 
DEBT 
SALINAS 
CONSTANT 
R-SQR 
ADJ R-SQR 
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EXPECTED 
SIGN 
+ 
+ 
+ 1- 
+ 
MODELA 
2955.51 1 
(1.6096) 
-650.279 
(2.4695) 
425.279 
(1.1241) 
-0.265 
(2.7061 
0.006 
(I .6086) 
-221.407 
0.787 
0.710 
MODEL B 
2170.306 
(1.0047) 
-41 7.1 26 
(1.641 4) 
-732.583 
(3.3223) 
-0.36 
(3.3042) 
1328.379 
0.675 
0.588 
MODELC 
2970.51 5 
(1.7644) 
162.941 
(0.6226) 
-28.401 
(0.1 038) 
-0.293 
(3.3975) 
830.836 
(3.3467) 
29.379 
0.81 9 
0.755 
: 
. 
it would be interesting to examine the impact of specific 
studies. 
The fact that the inflation variable (INF) is statistically 
insignificant in the expanded model (Model C) can be explained by 
the inclusion of the SALINAS variable. This is because both 
variables measure expectations. As such, the SALINAS variable 
must have picked up most of the variation caused by expectations. 
The fact that GDP growth rates switched from being 
insignificant (MODEL B) to significant (MODEL C) indicates that 
the GROWTH variable performs much better in conjunction with the 
SALINAS variable. There may be some multicollinearity5. 
Model C has an adjusted r-square of 0.754. Model B's 
adjusted r-square is -587. This tells us that purely economic 
factors cannot completely explain FDI in Mexico. Clearly, policy 
incentives and investor confidence in Mexico's political and 
economic stability should not be overlooked. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The results of my research suggests that the determinants of 
FDI in Mexico are both economic and political. Investor 
confidence in the political and economic stability of the country 
is an important factor. Often, there is no clearly defined 
distinction between a "political variable" and an "economic 
variable". The two are too inter-related in too many ways. As 
such, the Salinas administration has the unenviable task of 
getting both the politics and economics right in order to attract 
FDI. At this stage, it appears as though their policies are 
having a measurable impact on their ability to attract FDI. 
I believe that one of the main reasons Salinas has been so 
successful is that he has managed to structure a very attractive 
incentive package for foreign investors. Salinas has managed to 
get the message across that Mexico is an attractive place to 
invest. A promising avenue of future research would be an 
assessment of the effects of specific policies on FDI. 
Unfortunately, the data for such a study are not available. 
Hopefully, as research in this area receives more attention, 
reliable and comprehensive data sources will become available. 
A shortcoming of this study is that it fails to capture a 
more long-term perspective of the recent developments in Mexico 
on FDI patterns in Mexico. Of particular interest would be an 
evaluation of the overall impact of NAFTA on FDI in Mexico. Since 
the agreement has only recently been signed and will not fully 
take effect for a number of years, such a study cannot be 
undertaken for a few years yet. The Mexican - United States - 
Canadian free trade zone promises to be one of the most dynamic 
and exciting economic regions in the world. It is also 
potentially a rich source of valuable economic research, 
particularly in the area of FDI. 
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ENDNOTES 
1. Political and economic stability are very closely related. 
Even in industrialized countries like the US, whether a president 
is successfully re-elected for a second term depends on the 
economy's performance. In less developed nations, economic 
hardship can bring about political unrest. Political instability 
also hampers economic growth, As such, the terms "political 
stability" and "economic stability" will often be used 
interchangeably. 
2. The regression results are as follows : 
L-US = -49.604 + 0.0255xYear Adjusted R-square = -958 
L-Mex = 112.564 - 0.056l*Year Adjusted R-square = .828 
where L US is unit labor cost for the and L - Mex is unit 
labor cost for Mexico. 
3. Refer to Graph 2 for the graphical relationship between FDI 
and DEBT. 
4. Refer to Graph 4. 
5. Since the multicollinearity -- if it exists, is not a serious 
problem here, no attempt has been made to deal with it. 
*- 
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